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• eBook-Kapitel aus dem Buch Accounting Fraud

  Case 35: Parmalat (Italy, 2003)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …course of a decade. Many analysts took to calling Parmalat “Europe’s Enron”. Indeed, the scandal was so massive that it compares to Enron, WorldCom and… …that its accounting principles were in line with established international accounting standards as well as Italian standards. Yet it appeared not to be… …originality and unique appeal of Parmalat milk soon made it very popular and business expanded to other parts of Italy. Parmalat tried to style itself as the… …“Coca-Cola of milk”. In 1990, Parmalat was listed on the Milan stock exchange – and Tanzi built it into an Italian powerhouse with operations in some… …discovered. The collapse: How it all happened But as Tanzi’s empire grew, so did the debts. Some of the best-known European and American bank… …network of offshore shell companies. Whereas at first, Parmalat did not conform to the usual profile of a risky enterprise, it now operated through a… …, the Isle of Man and Malta. In early December 2003, analysts began to raise questions about Parmalat’s liquidity when the company let it be… …known that it could not access about EUR 500 million in supposedly liquid funds held in an obscure Cayman Islands-registered investment fund called… …“Epicu- rum”. Parmalat soon shocked financial markets when it revealed that it was having trouble coming up with the money to make a EUR 150 million bond… …repayment even though it supposedly had billions in cash and cash equivalents. The scandal came to light with the revelation of a non-existent bank…

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  Case 37: Siemens (Germany, 2006)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …transactions – payments where it was impossible to identify who received them or what services had been provided. Prosecutors in Italy, Liechtenstein and… …the raid, officials in the United States began investigating the case as well, not least because Siemens is listed on the NYSE. Knowing that it… …faced steep fines unless it cooperated, Siemens hired international law firm Debevoise & Plimpton to work with federal investigators and to conduct an… …division. Later in December, Siemens provided its first estimate of the extent of the scandal, saying it could reach EUR 420 million. But analysts pointed… …and the power genera- tion arm (which paid about USD 300 million in bribes). Altogether, it cost Siemens more than USD 2.6 billion to clear its name… …contracts were at the heart of the bribery scheme. In order to understand why Siemens was so susceptible to corruption, it is necessary to go back to the… …internal compliance department knew of the ongoing black money scandal. “It was a system of organized irresponsibility that was implicitly con- doned,” said… …series of industry trends and suffered from a collapse in overall demand. “It was about keeping the business unit alive and not jeopardizing thousands… …of jobs overnight. We all knew what we did was unlawful. But we thought we had to do it. Otherwise, we would ruin the company.” Thus, Siekaczek… …justified his wrongdoing as economic necessity. It is certainly worth delving into his insider’s account (see NYT December 21, 2008): – From 2002 to 2006…

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  Case 38: Daewoo Group (South Korea, 1999)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …biggest accounting frauds in history. It predated Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Parmalat and the other corporate scandals that more recently devastated… …. It produced autos, ships, televisions, pianos, refrigerators, aerospace components, and practically everything else – except significant profits… …weight of more than USD 80 billion in debts; it had been unable to meet its skyrocketing interest payments. Daewoo had become a huge financial black hole… …“rags-to-riches” founder of Daewoo Group ended in a big corporate fraud scandal. Although the government prosecutor’s office released only scant details, it… …group’s flagship company) was unable to keep the plant running, and the Ukrainian government complained. To placate it, Daewoo surreptitiously shipped… …organization. Located in Lon- don, it acted as the nerve center for the group’s financial machinations overseas. Only five key persons, who proceeded under the… …utmost secrecy, oversaw its busi- ness. The BFC never appeared on Daewoo’s balance sheets. Prosecutors portrayed it as Kim’s slush fund, but could not put… …from car-export revenues. Prosecutors could not say how the money was spent, but industry experts and analysts thought at least part of it was… …destination of the money (allegedly up to USD 20 billion) remained unclear. But it is very likely that it was siphoned off for political lobbying purposes and… …manner in which it was conducted and the way in which it lasted undetected until the end. An economic adviser to President Kim Dae Jung said much of what…

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  Case 39: Seibu Railway (Japan, 2004)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …than God: suspected Tsutsumi arrested.” Troubles began in October 2004 when it emerged that Seibu Railway had falsified shareholder information in… …Stock Exchange. The scandal deepened after it was found that from August through October 2004, Kokudo sold some of its shares in Seibu Railway… …without telling buyers that the railway firm’s stock ownership conditions made it subject to delisting. Tsutsumi and other Kokudo executives privately… …Holdings, among others. (Shiseido, e.g., said it had bought the Seibu shares only due to its “long-term business relationship” with Kokudo.) Besides… …lists of shareholders to make it look as if the company was more widely held than it actually was. As Kokudo’s largest shareholder, he hid the extent of… …financial statements to show that Mr. Tsutsumi and Kokudo owned most of Seibu, not just a minority stake. The scandal also took a high human toll: it… …that it deeply regretted the recent developments. “We’ll do our best to become a transparent company which can be trusted,” it said. The company was… …to protect inves- tors with greater transparency. The content of J-SOX is not entirely the same as that of US-SOX, but it is similar to sections 302…

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  Case 40: Kanebo (Japan, 2005)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …corporations. It had started making cotton in the 19th century and went on to become the number two in Japan’s cosmetic market. Its principal operations… …discovery of a series of accounting frauds in companies in the Japanese IT industry, and the frauds in Japan reminded many observers of the “Enron… …guilty to falsifying Kanebo’s financial statements. He had taken over the company in 1996, and when it became clear that he couldn’t stop the… …order to improve the company’s operating results and to make it appear solvent. Another method was improperly “de-consolidating” certain Kanebo… …those entries. When they pressed the issue, Hoashi argued that Chuo Aoyama had long accepted the company’s accounting practices and said it was pointless… …auditors. The presiding judge said: “The crime significantly eroded the public trust in the auditing system. It is shameful that they have failed to… …market turmoil in its wake. In a statement, PricewaterhouseCoopers said it would assist Chuo Aoyama in its reform efforts but at the same time… …called “Aarata” (meaning “new and fresh” in Japanese) commenced operations. In the subsequent weeks, it acquired dozens of former Chuo Aoyama clients. In… …addition, about one-fourth of the employees left Chuo Aoyama and joined Aarata. (Given the dire lack of qualified auditors in Japan, it would have been… …2007, Misuzu announced that it was disbanding. In the aftermath of the Kanebo audit failure, the FSA began to investigate the audit practices of…

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  Case 41: Livedoor (Japan, 2006)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …closely watched in Japan, not only because Horie was a celebrity, but also because it was seen as a test of how serious the authorities were about… …University, Horie built Livedoor by combin- ing a portal site with online brokerage and banking as well as a host of other inter- net services. (It offered… …: “It’s a world of connections, that’s it. If you are young, have no connections and you are from a modest family, there’s nothing you can do, your whole… …price: the deal involved a publishing firm that Live- door apparently already owned. Livedoor had arranged for an investment group it controlled to buy… …, in April 2006, Livedoor lost its listing. The TSE said the company had so far failed to clear up the suspicions that it had deceived investors… …prison. The presiding judge at the Tokyo district court said it was an extremely malicious crime that caused great damage to investors; the company’s… …invited criticism that he was singled out while others found guilty of similar violations had been let go with much lighter penalties. In Japan, it is… …, but the court ruled it was black.” Horie’s defence team tried to portray him as a meek chief executive who relied so heavily on advisers that they… …Court rejected Horie’s appeal of the district court conviction. The appeals court said it agreed with the ruling, arguing that Horie as chief executive… …issue. One Tokyo lawyer said: “It is all politics. Everyone thought this was going to be the next Enron, but now that the dust has settled, it looks to…

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  Case 42: Nikko Cordial (Japan, 2007)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …third-largest stockbroker- age group. As one of the nation’s leading securities houses, it should have been set- ting a good example on corporate disclosure for… …supervised status as it investigated whether the violations met the criteria for delisting. In the weeks to come, the share price plunged on speculation that… …gave the go-ahead to falsify the issuance date. Nikko Cordial behaved the way most Japanese firms do when misdeeds come to light: it promptly… …financial state- ments to the TSE, and in March the TSE announced its decision, which surprised most market participants. It decided not to delist Nikko…

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  Case 43: Sanyo Electric (Japan, 2007)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …Electric Co. struggled with heavy financial losses as it faced a brutally competitive pricing market for many of its products. These products (including… …should have accounted for USD 1.5 billion in subsidiaries’ losses in 2004 but booked only around USD 400 million, thus falsely reporting a profit when it… …was largely in the red. In February 2007, Sanyo admitted that it had been approached by Japan’s Secu- rities and Exchange Surveillance Commission… …(SESC) about its past accounting. Sanyo announced that the SESC was investigating it for allegedly failing to account for valuation losses made on… …the losses were focused on its LCD unit (which it liquidated later on) and its chip making division. Eventually, Sanyo said it might have to… …restate its earnings for the four years between 2000 and 2004. The investigation was a blow to Sanyo at a time when it made great efforts to turn… …temporarily after being implicated in financial statement fraud at Kanebo, the cosmetics firm. It had also been the auditor for Nikko Cordial, which had to… …and her reliance upon a consultancy firm run by her husband. In December 2007, Sanyo admitted that its group figures were wrong since 2000. It… …said it miscalculated earnings from dozens of subsidiary companies to the tune of USD 3.5 billion over six years to March 2006. In March 2004, it had… …falsely reported a profit instead of a loss. Sanyo apologized to investors, saying it would strengthen its management team and internal controls, but…

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  Case 44: Satyam Computer Services (India, 2009)

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …confidence in India Inc., and it is very difficult to restore their confidence.” In 2009, Satyam Computer Services was the fourth-largest Indian… …expanded it from a handful of employees into a back-office giant with a workforce of 53,000 and operations in 66 countries. Satyam delivered… …outsourcing solutions to nearly 700 clients, including 185 “Fortune 500” companies. Thus, it served as the back-office for some of the largest banks… …responsible for clients’ finances and accounting.) “For years, Ramalinga Raju was lionized as one of the whiz-kids of the Indian IT sector,” said one… …started as a mar- ginal gap between actual operating profit and the one reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow over the years. It has… …attained unmanageable propor- tions as the size of company operations grew,” Raju wrote. “It was like riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off without… …lents were, in fact, made out of thin air. Revenue for the quarter was 20% lower than reported, and the company’s profit margin was a fraction of what it… …staff. – Merrill Lynch, the U.S. investment bank, was engaged by Satyam to explore merger opportunities for the IT outsourcing giant. But within just… …fluctuations in the amount of “unbilled revenue” the company reported. (Unbilled revenue is work done for a customer but not yet invoiced: it represents future… …earnings. Accounting Fraud in Asian Companies 252 However, there is usually little documentation associated with the number, so it is easy to…

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  Fraud Theories

  Prof. Dr. Klaus Henselmann, Dr. Stefan Hofmann

  …Fraud Case Analysis: Lessons Learned 276 3.3 Fraud Theories 3.3.1 The Fraud Triangle Although it is common knowledge today that people… …may commit fraud, it is often not understood why they do it. Donald R. Cressey, one of the pioneers in fraud re- search, came to the conclusion that… …less rationalization it takes to motivate someone to commit a fraud. Likewise, the more dishonest a person is, the less opportunity or the less… …pressure it takes to motivate fraud. Fraud-fighters focus their preventive efforts primarily on only one of the three elements of the fraud triangle… …simply in the outcome. Scientists call this motivation the “ego challenge”: it relates to the sense of superiority over others and to the gratification… …obtained from the mastery of an exciting situation. It also reflects the pride of a professional “con artist”. Attitudes are the values and ethical… …honest all the time. Another 20% are basically dishonest, and about 60% are “situationally honest” (that is, honest where it pays to be honest and… …dishonest where it pays to be dishonest). However, most of the organizations are convinced that their executives are among the 20% who are honest. Unfortu-… …nately, quite frequently, this is not the case. Rationalization is how the fraudster justifies his inappropriate actions. In other words, it is the… …soon as we get over this financial difficulty.” – “Business is business. Everybody else does it.” Of course, there are countless other…

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